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C2PA, eIDAS and RFC 3161: The Standards Behind Trustworthy Photos

Three photo authenticity standards do the work. C2PA records where a file comes from and makes changes visible. An eIDAS qualified timestamp certifies the date. RFC 3161 is the protocol that lets anyone check that timestamp.

By Cédric Driaux, Founder of tryVidimus

Drawing of a photo with a shield, a clock and a document

Why photo authenticity standards matter

A photo is useful in a disagreement only if the other side can check it. Our photo evidence guide lists the four conditions: live capture, an independent date, a seal, and public verification. This page looks at the standards that make three of those conditions checkable by a stranger.

Why standards, and not a vendor's own format? Because a proprietary seal moves the question instead of answering it. If only the vendor's software can read the seal, the reader has to trust the vendor, exactly as they had to trust the person who sent the photo.

An open standard removes that dependency. Its specification is public, several independent tools implement it, and a proof made today can be read by software written by someone else. Take a rental platform that changes supplier after a few years: the photos sealed with open standards stay verifiable, because nothing in them needs the old supplier to be read.

StandardThe question it answersWho publishes it
C2PAWhere does this file come from, and has it changed?The Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity
eIDAS qualified timestampAt what date did this file exist, with what legal effect in the EU?The European Union (Regulation No 910/2014)
RFC 3161How is a timestamp requested, delivered and checked?The IETF, the body behind Internet standards

The three are complementary. None of them replaces another, and none of them is enough alone. The rest of this page takes them one by one, then shows how they fit together.

C2PA in one page

C2PA stands for Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity. The coalition was founded in 2021 by Adobe, Arm, BBC, Intel, Microsoft and Truepic, and is hosted by the Linux Foundation. It publishes an open technical specification that anyone can implement.

"Content Credentials" is the public name for what the standard produces: a C2PA manifest attached to a file. Camera makers, editing software, media and platforms use it to show where a file comes from. For a JPEG photo, the manifest travels inside the file itself.

A manifest is signed with an X.509 certificate and holds four things:

  • The claim generator: the tool that produced or changed the file.
  • Assertions: what happened to the file, for example captured by a camera, cropped or exported, and the files it was made from.
  • A hash of the content, which binds the manifest to these exact pixels.
  • The signature, which ties all of the above to the signer's certificate.

C2PA is tamper-evident, not tamper-proof. It does not stop anyone from editing a photo. If the pixels change outside a signed edit, the hash no longer matches and a validator reports the manifest as invalid.

The coalition also runs a conformance program. A generator product that passes it can get a signing certificate from a certification authority on the C2PA trust list. A validator can then tell a signature from a conformant product apart from a signature anyone could make with their own certificate.

Example: a guest photographs a scratched table through a capture page that signs with C2PA. Later, someone brightens the image to hide the scratch and forwards it. A validator shows that the file no longer matches its manifest.

Our article what is C2PA covers the manifest and the ways to read it, and the C2PA page goes further for developers.

Qualified timestamps under eIDAS

C2PA leaves the date open. That is the job of a timestamp: a signed statement, from a third party, that a given piece of data existed at a given time. Anyone can run a timestamp service, so the question becomes who the third party is.

eIDAS, Regulation (EU) No 910/2014, is the European framework for electronic trust services. It defines the qualified electronic time stamp: a time stamp issued by a qualified trust service provider. The European Commission publishes a browser of the trusted lists, where you can look up a provider and the services it is qualified for.

The legal effect sits in Article 41 of the eIDAS Regulation. An electronic time stamp cannot be refused as evidence solely because it is in electronic form. A qualified electronic time stamp enjoys a presumption of the accuracy of the date and time it indicates, and of the integrity of the data to which they are bound.

  • The presumption covers the date and the integrity of the data. It says nothing about what a photo depicts.
  • It applies in the European Union only. Elsewhere, the timestamp remains a signed, verifiable record of the date, without that presumption.
  • It attaches to qualified timestamps. A timestamp from an ordinary server can still be produced as evidence, but it does not carry the presumption.

Example: an insurer in Lyon receives photos of a water leak from a policyholder. With a qualified timestamp on the proof, the discussion about the date starts from a presumption instead of starting from the phone's clock. Our article on the qualified timestamp under eIDAS explains the difference with a simple timestamp and how to check a provider.

RFC 3161: the protocol underneath

eIDAS says what a qualified timestamp is worth. It does not describe the bytes on the wire. That part belongs to RFC 3161, the Internet standard for time stamps, published by the IETF.

The exchange has three steps:

  1. The client computes a fingerprint of its data, for example a SHA-256 hash, and sends that fingerprint to the timestamp authority.
  2. The authority adds its own time and signs the pair. The signed result is the timestamp token.
  3. Anyone who holds the data, the token and the authority's certificates can later check that the fingerprint matches and that the signature is valid.

Two properties matter for photos. The authority receives a fingerprint, never the file, so the photos stay private. And the token is a standard object: common tools such as OpenSSL can read and check it, without an account and without the company that requested it.

Example: a developer on the insurer's side downloads a token, checks it with OpenSSL against the authority's certificate chain, and reads the certified time. No call to the vendor is needed. The RFC 3161 guide for developers walks through the request, the token and the verification commands.

How the three standards combine

Each standard closes a gap left by the others: C2PA carries the origin and the integrity of one file, but its date comes from the signing tool. The timestamp certifies a date, but says nothing about where the file comes from. RFC 3161 makes the timestamp checkable by anyone, and eIDAS gives it a defined legal effect in the EU.

ObjectionWhat answers itHow a third party checks
"This file was edited."The C2PA manifest and the SHA-256 fingerprintA C2PA validator, or recomputing the fingerprint
"The date was changed."The qualified timestampThe RFC 3161 token, checked with OpenSSL or a verifier
"Who issued that date?"The qualified trust service providerThe European trusted list browser
"We only have your word."Open standards and a public verification pageAny independent tool that implements them

Here is how tryVidimus puts them together when a proof is sealed:

  1. The photo is taken live on a web capture page opened from a link, with no import from the gallery.
  2. Each file gets a SHA-256 fingerprint, and each photo is signed with a C2PA manifest.
  3. The proof receives one qualified electronic timestamp, requested over RFC 3161. In production it is issued by Certigna, a French qualified trust service provider.
  4. The proof gets a public verification page, open without an account.

tryVidimus is a C2PA conformant generator product: the conformance program issued its notice on 19 October 2026, at assurance level 1, for JPEG photos. The verifier is open source under the MIT licence, so a proof can be checked without our servers. The standards page states what we use and where the limits are.

If you are integrating this, the photo evidence API guide for developers shows the calls from the capture link to the sealed proof, and the documentation has the reference. If you are choosing where to use it first, the photo evidence use cases go sector by sector.

What none of them does: arbitrate

Standards certify facts about a file. They do not settle a dispute. This limit is easy to forget when a proof looks technical and complete.

  • No standard says the scene is truthful. A sealed photo of a staged scene is a faithfully sealed photo of a staged scene.
  • No standard says who held the phone. The proof is tied to the capture link that a person received, not to an identity check.
  • No standard judges damage. Two linked proofs, before and after, show what each party captured. They do not compare the photos or say whether a mark is new.
  • The "captured at" time of a file is the time observed by the service. It is not qualified: only the time certified by the timestamp authority is.

Take a van returned with a dent. The owner's proof shows the dent at return, with a certified date. The renter's proof at pickup shows the same door without it.

Both proofs are verifiable, and both sides can read them. Whether the renter owes anything is still a decision for the parties, the platform, an insurer or a judge.

That is the position we hold for tryVidimus: certify, never arbitrate. A proof that claims more than it can show is easier to attack than a proof that states its limits. The standards on this page are useful because they say exactly what they cover.

Frequently asked questions

What are the main photo authenticity standards?

Three standards cover most of the ground. C2PA records where a file comes from and makes any later change detectable. The eIDAS qualified electronic timestamp certifies the date, with a legal presumption in the European Union. RFC 3161 is the technical protocol used to request and verify that timestamp. They are complementary: each answers a different objection.

Is C2PA enough to prove when a photo was taken?

No. The date in a C2PA manifest is written by the tool that signs the file, so it is only as reliable as that tool's clock. To certify a date, the file's fingerprint has to be stamped by an independent timestamp authority. That is why a sealed proof combines a C2PA signature with a separate timestamp.

Does a qualified timestamp have legal value outside the EU?

The presumption set by Article 41 of the eIDAS Regulation applies in the European Union only. Elsewhere, a qualified timestamp is still a signed record of the date that anyone can verify with standard tools, but it does not carry that presumption. How much weight it gets depends on local rules: for a specific case, ask a lawyer.

Does the timestamp authority see my photos?

No. Under RFC 3161, the client sends a fingerprint of the data, not the data. A fingerprint such as a SHA-256 hash cannot be turned back into the photo. With tryVidimus, the authority receives the fingerprint of the proof, never the photos, and returns a signed token that binds this fingerprint to a certified time.

Can I verify a sealed photo without trusting the vendor?

Yes, and this is the reason to use open standards. A C2PA manifest can be read with independent tools such as Content Credentials Verify or c2patool. An RFC 3161 token can be checked with OpenSSL. For a tryVidimus proof, the public verification page needs no account, and the open-source verifier runs the checks on your own machine.

Do these standards prove that a photo shows the truth?

No. They show that a file existed at a certified date, that it has not changed since, and which tool produced it. They do not say that the scene is truthful, who held the phone, or what condition an object was really in. Weighing the photo remains the job of the parties, an insurer or a judge.

Try it in the sandbox

Photo authenticity standards do not make a photo true: they make its origin, its date and its integrity checkable by someone who does not trust you. C2PA, the eIDAS qualified timestamp and RFC 3161 each cover one part, and state what they leave out. You can seal test proofs and read them with these tools for free in the sandbox, without a card.

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Official sources

Cédric Driaux · Founder of tryVidimus

Cédric Driaux is the founder of tryVidimus, published by Fyher. He has been a software developer for 23 years. He also builds ScanStay, a photo proof tool for short-term rental hosts.

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